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This paper provides an overview of the relationship between economics and religion. It first 
considers the effects of economic incentives in the religious marketplace on consumers’ 
demand for “religion.” It then shows how this demand affects religious institutions and 
generates a supply of religious goods and services. Other topics include the structure of this 
religious marketplace and the related “marketplace for ideas” in a religiously pluralistic 
society. Empirical evidence is summarized for the effects on selected economic behaviors of 
religious affiliation and intensity of belief or practice. 
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Economics and Religion 
Introduction 
The last two decades of the 20
th century have seen an explosion of empirical as 
well as theoretical research into the relationship between religion and economic behavior.  
For the most part this research ignores theological differences, focusing instead on 
behavioral differences associated with different religious identities. The causation runs 
both ways:  some studies analyze the effects of religious identity on various economic 
activities, and others analyze the effects of economic incentives on religious observances 
and institutions.   Both of these lines of research have yielded strong results and have 
dramatically affected our understanding of the relationship between economics and 
religion.  Prices and incomes are powerful incentives that invariably influence the actions 
of individuals, and the human capacity for creative rationalization contributes to the 
widespread evasion of costly behaviors, including costly religious strictures.  
Before economics became a modern social science, casual observation generated 
many stereotypes about differences between religious groups regarding economic 
success, differences that were often attributed to differences in religious teachings.  
Today these arguments are viewed with skepticism.  Some are based on stereotypes that 
do not stand up to empirical scrutiny.  Others are based on an imperfect understanding of 
the religious teachings to which they refer.  Recent research suggests that some of the 
most important differences between religious groups can be explained not directly, by the 
religious strictures themselves, but indirectly by intervening variables that affect the 
economic incentives faced by individuals.     2
To provide an overview of this subject, this essay begins with a consideration of 
the economic incentives affecting a consumer’s decisions in the religious marketplace – 
that is to say, the demand for “religion.”  It will then look at how this demand affects 
religious institutions and generates a supply of religious goods and services.   Other 
topics will include the structure of this religious marketplace and the related “marketplace 
for ideas” in a religiously pluralistic society.  Finally there will be a brief discussion of 
empirical findings for the effects of religious affiliation and intensity of belief or practice 
on selected economic behaviors. 
The Demand for Religion 
From the perspective of an individual consumer, religious expression is an 
economic good that must compete with all other goods for a share of the resource budget.  
It is not a good in the material sense, but rather an intangible for which people express a 
preference by their willingness to spend time and money on its acquisition.   Nor is it a 
good that can be purchased in a consumption-ready form.  It belongs to the category of 
economic goods that must be self-produced by each individual. The consumer may buy 
goods and services that contribute to this end, but must spend his or her own time to use 
them in a way that creates a religious experience. 
The theological aspects of any particular religion may be thought of as its 
technology, a set of “recipes” or blueprints for behaviors, expenditures and beliefs that 
will produce the desired results.   This gives the consumer a production function that 
converts time and money – that is, labor and capital – into an output that can be called 
“religious experience.”  The substance of this theology is generally irrelevant for an 
economic analysis, much as the theory of the firm can analyze its behavior without   3
specifying the particular good it produces or the specifics of its production.  What follows 
here is a similar abstraction, an analytical framework that can be applied to good effect 
for deepening our understanding of many different religious behaviors. 
In their seminal work on this subject, Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) suggest that 
religion is best thought of as a bundle of three distinct but inter-related goods.  First there 
is spirituality, the desire for which seems to be a primal human impulse that finds some 
sort of expression in every society from the earliest times to the present.  Then there is the 
fact that religion always seems to have a collective dimension – an individual “joins” or 
“belongs to” a particular religion and observes various rituals as a “member” of this 
group, typically in conjunction with other adherents.   These two aspects of religion are 
sometimes referred to as its “spiritual good” and its “social good,” respectively.  Religion 
also addresses the dilemma of human mortality, the frightening inevitability of death and 
its implications for the meaning of life.  This is usually referred to as the “afterlife good,” 
although not every religion speaks to this need by positing an explicit life after death.  In 
most religions these three “goods” are bundled into a single product called “religion,” but 
since their economic attributes differ it is useful to consider them separately. 
Supernatural Being(s):  The Spiritual Good 
For many people, the search for spirituality is at the heart of any religious 
experience.  Not everyone feels deeply about this – preferences vary, just as they do 
when the subject is ice cream or toys or fashionable clothing.   Regardless of the priority 
placed on it, however, for most people spirituality is the central quality that effectively 
defines an experience as religious.    4
Spirituality is a classic example of a self-produced good.  It is very, very personal 
and can never be acquired without intimate involvement of the individual consumer.  The 
religious technology (theology) provides a guide for behaviors that will achieve this, 
religious rituals and their associated objects are designed to facilitate the process, and 
religious professionals are there to support and direct these activities.  Yet in the end, it is 
the individual alone who has this spiritual experience at a deeply personal level.  Like 
other dimensions of human capital, it can not occur without the individual’s participation 
and once it has occurred it is inalienable from that person. 
 Although the spiritual impulse seems to be a basic human need, the extent to 
which a person chooses to indulge in it is certainly affected by its price.  Using a basic 
two-factor production function approach, the full price of this good is the direct cost of 
purchased goods and services and the indirect cost of the time spent in pursuit of 
spirituality.  Some religions make heavy demands on consumers’ incomes, but many of 
the most popular can be practiced with little direct expenditure.  The search for 
spirituality thus tends to be a relatively time-intensive activity, and its full price is 
therefore sensitive to the value of a consumer’s time. 
Time is valued at its opportunity cost, and a consumer’s budget is allocated 
optimally when the marginal value of time is the same in every alternative use.  It is 
conventional to use the wage rate as a first approximation of this value, whether the 
actual wage for those who participate in the labor force or the shadow wage for those 
who do not.  The full price of a time-intensive religious activity is thus positively related 
to the wage rate.   Full income is also positively related to the wage rate, especially for 
people in the positively-sloped region of their labor supply curve.     The effect of higher   5
wages on the demand for spirituality is thus ambiguous:  a higher full price reduces the 
quantity demanded but the higher income shifts the demand curve to the right.  Empirical 
studies suggest that for most Americans the price effect dominates the income effect so 
that higher wages are associated with less time spent in religious activities seeking 
spirituality. 
In the production process, a relatively high cost of labor is an incentive to 
“economize” by becoming more capital intensive.  In the search for spirituality, this takes 
the form of religious practices that substitute money for time.  A high-wage person, for 
example, might purchase expensive religious objects but spend little time using them, 
might donate generously to causes associated with godliness, or might hire a substitute to 
engage in specific religious rituals on his or her behalf.  Expensive time is also an 
incentive for innovations that raise its marginal product, whether by investing in skills 
relevant for the production of spirituality or by altering the religious environment in ways 
more suitable for (complementary to) the reduced time inputs.   
This model has implications that result in testable hypotheses that appear to be 
consistent with the behavior of American consumers.  Wealthy consumers often donate 
large amounts of money to religious causes even though they may not devote much of 
their own time to religious activities.  Congregations with less time-intensive religious 
practices, like shorter services or fewer holy days, tend to attract disproportionately 
congregants at the upper end of the wage distribution.  American religious institutions 
have also been innovative in adapting to the spiritual needs of consumers with a high 
value of time, for example with services conducted in the English language or sermons 
applicable to a busy lifestyle.   6
Belonging:  The Social Good 
In contrast with the search for spirituality, which is an intensely personal activity, 
adopting a specific religion implies participating in a group of similarly inclined 
individuals.  This aspect of the demand for religion is analyzed as a “club” good, drawing 
on an extensive economics literature on Club Theory.   Like other self-produced goods, a 
club good can not be purchased directly but must be produced with the consumer’s own 
time and effort.  A club good, however, can not be produced by a single consumer in 
isolation.  The productivity of resources that one individual devotes to making this good 
depends on the resource allocations made by other members of the club.  For example, 
joining the church choir has different implications for a consumer’s religious experience 
depending on how many others join the choir and with what intensity of religious 
participation.   
 Although all religions contain some measure of this characteristic, they vary in 
the way in which it is displayed.  At one extreme it may be possible to “buy” a 
membership, either directly or indirectly by making a large donation.  Such a group 
would lack spiritual content and thus raises the question as to whether it is truly a 
religion.  Most religions, however, require some participation in group rituals related to 
worship, to life-cycle celebrations, or to obtaining or demonstrating merit by performing 
good deeds.  In each case, the religious experience a consumer obtains as output depends 
not only on the effective use of his or her own resources, but also on their 
complementarity with the resources devoted by other participants in the group.  
Because of this interaction, clubs are a “quasi-public” good in the sense that they 
have some but not all properties of a public good.  Like a true public good, a consumer   7
can belong to a religion without diminishing its availability to other consumers.  Unlike a 
true public good, however, a club can devise means of limiting membership and thus 
excluding potential consumers.  This can be done by charging a membership fee or by 
specific criteria such as age, gender, race, profession, national origin, or place of 
residence.  Although some religious groups use such means of restricting entry, these are 
generally eschewed by most American religions on the basis of theological, social or 
political principles.  
A club with important inter-personal complementarities that does not limit entry 
is faced with the classic “free-rider” problem.  Since the productivity of a consumer’s 
resources is enhanced by the resources devoted to the club by its other members, he or 
she has an incentive to choose a group where the other members spend more than he or 
she does.     In effect, individuals try to economize on their own resources by substituting 
the resources of others.  But it is mathematically impossible for everyone in the group to 
spend below the average.  People spending more than the average are getting less output 
for their resources and have an incentive to seek another group where they could obtain a 
greater benefit from the same resource expenditure.  When these people leave the original 
group it begins an immiserating spiral that makes it increasingly unable to attract new 
members.  
In a classic paper, Iannaccone (1992) considers this free-rider problem in the 
context of religious groups.  He points out that many religions impose implicit taxes on 
their members as a means of supporting the religious group itself.  This can take the form 
of tithing, of requiring the purchase of expensive religious articles, or of social pressure 
to donate money.  There can also be a “tax” on time if membership requires volunteering   8
for time-intensive ritual or charitable activities.  Even in the absence of such taxes, 
however, many religions require a “sacrifice” of goods or time by which is meant a 
donation that is actually destroyed as part of a religious ritual.  A sacrifice does not 
contribute directly to the support of the group itself, but from the individual’s perspective 
it is similar to a membership fee.  It thus serves to discourage people from joining if their 
resource contributions would otherwise be lower than the value of the required sacrifice.  
By discouraging participation by people whose commitment to the group is low, a large 
sacrifice can raise the average level of commitment and thus benefit the remaining group 
members indirectly.  A religion may also impose non-monetary requirements to 
discourage adherents who might otherwise leave the group.  Requirements such as those 
affecting clothing, appearance, or diet, serve to identify adherents as committed members 
of the group but would be stigmatizing in the world of non-adherents.  Both sacrifice and 
stigma are commonly observed characteristics of religion that serve to limit the problem 
of free-riders in the religious community. 
An Unusual Investment:  The Afterlife Good 
Mortality is at the heart of the human condition, and religion is an important way 
in which people deal with the uncertainties and loss associated with their own death and 
that of their loved ones.  Religions typically address this issue by embedding the 
relatively short life span of a human being in a larger picture of eternal life.  There are 
various ways in which a theology deals with this question, but one that is very common is 
to posit a more or less explicit life which a person will experience after his own death.  
As long as an action during a person’s current life on earth will have consequences for his 
or her circumstances in this afterlife, there is an incentive to alter current behavior with a   9
view toward this long-run future.  The benefits of good behavior induced by this theology 
are summarized by the term “afterlife good.”  
A religious theology posits afterlife rewards to people who spend their time and 
money on “good” behaviors and afterlife punishments to those who spend their resources 
on “bad” behaviors.  To the extent that this causes a consumer to alter his or her spending 
patterns, it trades present utility for future rewards after death.  In this respect it is best 
thought of as an investment rather than a consumption good, and as such it can be treated 
analytically like any other investment.  Other investments, however, are typically 
designed to yield their rewards at a later point in a person’s lifetime, whereas the afterlife 
good pays off only after the investor is dead.  The optimal strategy is thus to invest first 
in prospects that mature earlier and postpone this late-payoff investment until later in life.  
This is consistent with the observation that older people tend to spend more time and 
money on religious participation than do youngsters, and it reinforces any tendency for 
people to become more concerned with the afterlife as they face their own mortality.   
The Supply of Religion 
Since religious experience is a self-produced good, there is no explicit market for 
it and so no supply curve in the usual sense.  Yet there is a market for religious goods and 
services, and there is a large sociology literature that views the religious sphere as having 
a “marketplace of ideas” (Warner 1993).  In this marketplace religious groups compete 
with each other for adherents in much the same way that firms compete for customers, 
and individuals seek out a religious congregation to join in much the same way as they 
shop for other goods and services.  Much of this sociology literature is concerned with 
the structure of this market, highly competitive in the United States but more like a   10
monopoly in countries with a state religion.  This analogy has contributed much to a new 
understanding of the economic aspects of religion.   
A fundamental requirement for a market to be competitive is free entry of new 
firms and free exit of firms that are unsuccessful.  Religious “startups” are characteristic 
of the American religious scene.   New congregations frequently appear within 
established religious denominations, and entirely new religions can and do emerge.  Most 
of these new religions are small and many of them eventually disappear for lack of 
followers, but some –like the Church of the Latter Day Saints (Mormon) and Christian 
Science – have been very successful and grew into established religions.   
Unlike religious monopolies that are licensed (and funded) by the government and 
typically managed by a religious hierarchy or bureaucracy, competitive religious markets 
are characterized by independent congregations that hire their own clergy.  The clergy in 
a competitive market are responsible directly to their congregants and thus tend to be 
more sensitive to their religious needs.  Also unlike a religious monopoly structure, 
congregationalism finds it more efficient to conduct non-ritual religious functions (e.g., 
charities or proselytizing) in a separate set of para-religious organizations. It is also 
common for congregations within the same religious denomination to form an umbrella 
organization (analogous to an industry group) to represent their common interests in the 
larger society.   
Each of these types of religious organization is characteristic of the United States, 
a pluralistic society in which religious markets are highly competitive.  In countries with 
one or more state religions, however, the government-sanctioned religious body typically 
carries out all of these religion-related functions.  As an indication of how distinctive   11
American religious pluralism actually is, the separation of function associated with 
religious pluralism is frequently described as a symptom of “Americanization” in a 
religious group. 
Religious Human Capital 
Most people think of themselves as having been born into a religion, suggesting 
that perhaps they have no choice as to where they belong.  While it is true that a person 
may be born into a family that practices a certain religion, it is not true that this religion is 
innate in a newborn child.  In fact, religious education and training are an important part 
of a child’s upbringing, often from a very young age.  The consequence of this training is 
that youngsters accumulate human capital – skills, knowledge, memories, sensations – 
specific to a particular religion, denomination, or perhaps even congregation.  The more 
religious human capital a person has, the more efficiently he or she can obtain a religious 
experience from any given amount of resources.  Religious education is an important 
activity for the community as a whole as well as for its individual members, and it is the 
core function of any proselytizing undertaken by a religious group.   
A human capital approach provides additional insights into the workings of a 
competitive religious market for adults.  Each religion may be thought of as having its 
own religion-specific human capital, the formation of which is characterized by the usual 
positively-sloped marginal cost curve.   Each person may be thought of as accumulating 
religion-specific human capital until the (shadow) marginal rate of return to religious 
education approaches the marginal rate of return to other types of human capital.  If a 
person were to convert to a different religion, the human capital specific to the “old” 
religion would lose its productive value and human capital specific to the “new” religion   12
would need to be acquired.  The economics of religious switching is formally analogous 
to occupational change or to international migration, a new investment that would be 
attractive only if the benefits outweigh the costs.  The incentives are such that conversion 
is less likely to occur the greater the human capital intensity of either the “old” or the 
“new” religion, and it is most likely to occur between denominations with similar human 
capital where religious skills are highly transferable as, for example, among mainline 
Protestant denominations in the U.S.  Religious switching is also more likely among 
young adults who have not yet made heavy religion-specific investments.   
Religion and Socio-economic Behavior 
Religions differ with respect to the compatibility of their teachings with other 
aspects of the society to which their adherents belong.  This can be analyzed as the 
degree of complementarity between religious and other forms of human capital and the 
mutual complementarity among different kinds of human capital investments (Chiswick 
2006).   People whose religious teachings complement the public school curriculum, for 
example, would have higher rates of return to both types of education and therefore an 
incentive to invest in both religious and non-religious human capital.  Adherents of these 
religions tend to have high levels of education, better health, lower fertility, and marriage 
patterns that tend to go along with these attributes.   
In contrast, people whose religious teachings are anti-complimentary (i.e., 
contradictory) to a public school curriculum would have an incentive to specialize in 
either religious or non-religious investments in human capital.  Those who invest more 
heavily in religious human capital would face lower rates of return to investments in 
secular education, for example, and those who choose to invest in non-religious forms of   13
human capital would have less incentive to invest in religious education.  In these 
denominations adherents who are very religious tend to have low levels of education and 
health, high fertility, and marriage patterns associated with their consequent low socio-
economic status, and adherents with greater secular achievements would tend to have 
lower levels of religious observance.   
Empirical Evidence 
Empirical analyses of economic and demographic behaviors in the United States 
suggest that religion is an important factor in many decisions related to education, health, 
fertility, marriage and divorce.  This literature distinguishes between religious affiliation, 
on the one hand, and the degree of religiosity on the other.  Whether or not a person 
identifies himself as belonging to a particular religion or denomination seems to be less 
important than the intensity of religious observance and the degree of commitment to the 
group.  Some of these findings fit conventional stereotypes, but some do not.   
Data on Religion and Economics 
Empirical analyses of the effect of religion on economic and demographic 
behaviors are constrained by the paucity of data.  Data collected by the U.S. Government 
generally does not have a question on religion.  A few economic surveys ask respondents 
to self-identify as Protestant, Catholic, Jew, or Others, categories that are too 
heterogeneous for testing hypotheses about religious behavior.  The National Survey of 
Religious Identity (NSRI) and the American Religious Identity Survey (ARIS) have 
nation-wide random samples with considerable detail for self-identified religion.  A 
number of other sets of data are available from the website of The Association of 
Religion Data Archives (ARDA) also have questions about religion, some more detailed   14
than others, but few of these data sources have information on employment or wage rates 
that would be useful to test economic hypotheses.  Newer surveys are beginning to 
address this problem, but in the meantime only a few of the existing data sets can be used 
to study the influence of economic factors on religious behavior.   
Studies that use economic data to analyze the effects of religious identification on 
economic and demographic behaviors find that the usual religion categories – Protestant, 
Catholic, Jew, Other – are too heterogeneous to be very useful.  The aggregation 
principles for religious groupings should be analogous to those used for aggregating 
factors of production or industrial output.  Religions can be grouped together into a single 
category if they are close substitutes with each other or if their respective types of 
religious human capital have similar complementarity properties with respect to non-
religious human capital.  Religions should be separated into different groupings if neither 
of these conditions holds.  The so-called Mainstream Protestant denominations can be 
grouped together because they typically have very similar religious human capital.  
Fundamentalist Protestant denominations can be grouped together because they typically 
share a strained relationship between religious human capital and some of the non-
religious human capital of mainstream America.  In contrast, Mainstream Protestants and 
Fundamentalist Protestants should not be grouped with each other because they differ 
with respect to both religious human capital and its complementarity with non-religious 
human capital.   
Empirical results are much clearer when religious identification variables are 
classified according to these principles.  It has become conventional to distinguish 
between “fundamentalist” and “mainstream” Protestant denominations. If the data permit,   15
it is also useful to split out the Mormons and the “African” Protestant denominations into 
separate categories.  The Other category includes a number of very small groups, but 
whenever possible the people reporting no religion (including agnostics and atheists) 
should be separated from those identifying with small religious groups (e.g., Greek 
Orthodox, Buddhists, Hindus, Moslems).   
Variables relating to the degree of religiosity – that is, to the intensity of religious 
observance without regard to the particular religion – also need to be interpreted with 
caution.   Some of the most common questions ask about the frequency of attendance at 
religious services and donations of money (and sometimes of time) to religious 
organizations.  Other questions may ask about beliefs: whether there is a supernatural 
deity (God), whether there is life after death, or whether the words of the Bible are to be 
taken literally.  These questions are reasonably good indicators of religiosity for 
Protestant religions, and perhaps for Christians in general, who usually comprise the large 
majority of American respondents.  For other religions, however, they may be less apt.  
The concept of God, for example, may be different for some of the Asian religions than it 
is for the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.  As another example, 
intensely religious Jews may interpret the Bible literally only in its original Hebrew 
language, subject not only to variations in translation but also to a variety of possible 
interpretations of its original intent.  Such differences reduce the effectiveness of these 
questions as general indicators of religiosity, although the problems are assumed to be 
small for samples with mainly Christian respondents.  
As an increasing number of immigrants bring with them a religion that is 
relatively new to the United States, another issue arises with regard to intensity of   16
religious practice.  This occurs when a religion is specific to a particular ethnic group, as 
is the case for Jews, Greeks, Armenians and Russians.  (It was also the case for Roman 
Catholics in an earlier era, when immigrants from Ireland, Italy, Germany and Poland 
attended separate churches, but their descendants today are no longer deeply divided 
along ethnic lines.)  The distinction between ethnicity and religion is not always clear in 
such cases, and survey respondents might indicate belonging to a religion when in fact 
their identity is primarily with the ethnic group.  Even if their actual beliefs are similar to 
those of agnostics or atheists, the fact that they observe religious rituals as part of their 
ethnic activity may lead them to self-identify otherwise.   
Some Preliminary Findings 
With these considerations in mind, a number of empirical studies have 
investigated the effects of religion and religiosity on economic and demographic 
behaviors (Lehrer 2009).  The evidence for the United States is generally consistent with 
the predictions of economic theory, but for the most part the particular religion to which a 
person belongs does not seem to matter as much as the fact that a person belongs to some 
religion rather than none.  It is possible that this arises because people ignore religious 
teachings (theology) when making human capital investment decisions.  It is possible, 
however, that in a pluralistic society religion would have low explanatory power for 
statistical reasons.  For example, suppose people tend to choose an affiliation compatible 
with their non-religious human capital portfolio, and suppose religious groups tend to 
adapt practices and even teachings to be compatible with the characteristics of their 
members.  The data would then show that people are sorted into religious groups by their   17
socio-economic characteristics and there would be little additional explanatory power for 
religion after controlling for the usual determinants of a human capital investment.  
The empirical evidence for the United States also suggests that the degree of 
religiosity has a very important effect on investments in non-religious human capital.  
Measures of religiosity describe an individual’s commitment to religious practices (e.g., 
church attendance) and the intensity of his or her belief in its theology.  For at least some 
of the socio-economic outcomes religiosity seems to have a non-linear effect.  For 
example, education levels tend to rise with religiosity up to a point, but people with very 
high levels of education tend to have low levels of religiosity.  This pattern is consistent 
with predictions of the human capital model outlined above.  People whose religious 
human capital is complementary with secular investments would exhibit a positive 
relationship between religiosity and, say, education, while those with anti-complementary 
religious human capital would combine high religiosity with low education levels or low 
religiosity with high education levels.   
Institutional Change 
Americans affiliate with religions that have adherents in other parts of the world.  
Some of these are international with a leadership established somewhere in its “world 
headquarters,” while others are rooted in a single country to which adherents look for 
inspiration and guidance.  In either case, however, the adherents living in the United 
States typically alter their observances (and even sometimes their beliefs) to better fit the 
American socio-economic scene in a process that is labeled “Americanization.”  This 
may be perceived as a falling-off of religious observance, yet the evidence suggests that 
Americans are among the most religious people in the modern world.     18
Economic analysis suggests an alternative interpretation in which 
Americanization is seen not as rampant materialism but rather an adaptive response to 
different economic circumstances.  High American wage rates provide an incentive to 
substitute goods for time in the production of any religious experience – hence the 
observed tendency towards “materialism” – but they also provide an incentive to improve 
the efficiency of time spent in religious observance.  In a competitive religious 
marketplace people seek the religious community most compatible with their personal 
preferences, and clergy have an incentive to be sensitive to the religious needs of their 
congregants.  Religious education also adapts to the relatively high education level of 
American congregants, and human capital formation is another means of raising the 
efficiency of time spent in religious activity.  As Americans adapt their consumption 
patterns to changes in their economic environment, their religious consumption patterns 
and even theologies also change, and their congregations change along with them.   
This institutional adaptability goes a long way toward explaining why religion 
continues to play an important role in American life despite all predictions to the 
contrary.  Karl Marx characterized religion as “the opiate of the masses” that should 
disappear with economic development – it has not.  Others believed that religion could 
not survive the scrutiny of science and would disappear among people with high levels of 
secular education – it has not.  Instead, evidence for the United States suggests that when 
wages and wealth are held constant, religious participation actually increases with the 
level of education.  By placing religion and religiosity in their economic context, it is 
possible to obtain a deeper appreciation of the social importance of religion and its ability 
to thrive in many different circumstances.   19
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